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Abstract
An examination of how increased turnover among legislators in the
fifty U.S. states affects fiscal policy and economic growth finds that it
makes legislators short-sighted. Turnover increases the size of gov-
ernment by increasing the shares of both total spending and taxes
in income. In particular, turnover increases capital expenditure and
income taxes, both of which may cause long-run distortions in the
economy. Further, increased turnover, by resulting in inefficient fiscal
policy, reduces long-term economic growth.
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1 Introduction
Elections allow voters to affect policy. A survey conducted by the National
Election Study of 2004 asked voters whether elections make government
pay attention to what people think. About fifty-five percent of respondents
said a good deal, and only seven percent said not much. Forty percent
strongly agreed that it makes a difference who is in power, while only five
percent thought it does not. Almost forty-five percent strongly agreed that
who people vote for makes a difference; only 7.5 percent strongly disagreed.
Elections could affect policy by several channels. One such channel
is partisan changes (Hibbs 1977, Garand 1988, Rogers and Rogers 2000,
Brauninger 2005). The main argument is that elections may lead to changes
in policy because of differences in the ideological preferences of the rul-
ing party. Another channel is political competition and conflict between
the political players. Political competition may result in efficient policy-
making (Stigler 1972, Wittman 1989), with some evidence supporting that
idea: low competition in the U.S. states leads to higher taxes, lower capi-
tal spending, lower likelihood of right-to-work laws, and weaker economic
growth (Besley and Case 2003, and Besley et al. 2010). Political competition,
however, may induce excessive rent-seeking and result in inefficient policy
(Tullock 1967, Krueger 1974, McCormick et al. 1984, Polo 1998, Svensson
1998, Lizzeri and Persico 2005).
Our study of political competition examines how legislative turnover
affects government fiscal policy and growth in the fifty U.S. states over the
years 1980-2007. The decline in turnover over time in the U.S. is studied by
many authors (see, for example, Rosenthal 1974a, Shin and Jackson 1979,
Niemi and Winsky 1987, and Moncrief et al. 2004, 2008). Also well studied is
how policy outcomes affect electoral outcomes, such as the likelihood of re-
election and turnover (see Chubb 1988, Besley and Case 1995, Brender 2003,
Brender and Drazen 2008). In contrast to such work, turnover is used in
our paper as an explanatory variable which can affect policy outcomes. We
exploit the exogenous variation in legislative turnover induced by the laws
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enacted in many states to restrict the number of terms their representatives
could serve, and by implementation of state redistricting plans. Despite
varying stringency of term limits in the states, legislative turnover has in-
creased dramatically in term-limited states compared to non-term-limited
states. The average rates of turnover for the two types of states are plotted
in Figure 1. Until the mid-1990s the rate of turnover is similar in the two sets
of states. In the mid-1990s, however, when term limits started taking effect
in many states, the rate of turnover in term-limited states increased dramat-
ically compared to the non-term-limited states. Also, Figure 1 suggests that
legislative turnover is generally higher in years immediately following the
implementation of decennial redistricting plans than in other years.
How turnover affects policy is not clear. On one hand, infrequent
turnover and long tenure of elected officials can entrench them and es-
tablish a culture of spending (Payne 1991, Hibbing 1991). Longer tenure
of elected officials can strengthen their hold on office and allows them to
collude with other officials to increase spending on programs they favor
(Adam and Kenny 1986). A longer tenure also allows an incumbent to accu-
mulate brand-name capital, which serves as a barrier to entry to challengers
and allows incumbents to shirk (Lott 1986, 1987). But short tenures have
their disadvantages. High turnover in legislative committees affects legis-
lators’ performance (Rosenthal 1974b, p. 170). High turnover can be costly
to the electorate by substituting inexperienced politicians for experienced
ones (Adams and Kenny 1986), and by weakening reelection constraints
(Crain 1977). High turnover could force incumbents to extract maximum
rent today. The higher extraction relates to the “stationary bandit” theory
(see McGuire and Olson 1996) which argues that an incumbent who expects
to stay in power for a long time has an incentive to promote economic de-
velopment because he will then increase his private consumption through
increased tax revenues resulting from economic growth. Evidence for such
an effect is given by Bejar (2012), who finds that a coalition government
will spend more the greater the hazard rate that the coalition will fall. Ad-
ditionally, an increase in the hazard rate of coalition governments by one
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standard deviation above its mean reduces the rate of economic growth by
1.5 percent.
Commitment to a policy may be made difficult when turnover is high.1
In the absence of credible commitments, an incumbent government has an
incentive to use debt to influence the policies of a successor whose policy
preferences are different (Alesina and Tabellini 1990). To illustrate, suppose
one party prefers spending on education, and dislikes spending on the
poor, whereas the other party has the opposite preferences. Suppose the
incumbent party favors education spending, but fears losing power after
the next election. The incumbent would then spend much on education,
and issue debt so that if the opposing party wins power, it would have to
service the debt and would be able to spend little on the poor.2 Persson and
Svensson (1989) also argue that a conservative government may accumulate
more debt when it expects to be replaced by a liberal government than when
it expects to stay in power. Indeed, empirical work finds that the volatility
of fiscal policy increases with legislative turnover (Crain and Tollison 1993).
Though aggregate fiscal variables (such as total spending, taxes, and
public debt) are commonly studied in the literature, an incumbent may ma-
nipulate the composition rather than only the aggregate values of these vari-
ables. It is not entirely clear, however, what these compositional effects may
be. On one hand, some evidence suggests that lack of commitments between
current and future majorities encourages public consumption over public
investment (Leblanc et al. 2000). Data also show that legislative turnover in
states in India distorts government expenditures: high turnover increases
the size of government and increases public consumption at the expense of
public investment, reflecting legislators who are more shortsighted (Uppal
2011). On the other hand, voters or legislators who fear losing power may fa-
1 For discussions of commitment, see Alesina and Tabellini 1990, Tabellini and Alesina
1990, and Persson and Svensson 1989.
2 Other effects can also appear. A legislator who fears losing office may favor policies
which, in the long run, may increase his electoral prospects. For example, he may favor
inefficient policies which induce voters who oppose his policies to move elsewhere (Glaeser
and Shleifer 2005, and Brueckner and Glazer 2008).
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vor durable, capital-intensive projects over more efficient, smaller, projects,
intending to constrain the policy set of future governments (Glazer 1989).
Some empirical evidence supports these ideas. State governments in India
manipulate fiscal policy in the form of tax breaks for some producers and
higher spending on public investment projects around elections (Khemani
2004). Investment increases and some components of current spending de-
cline in Columbian municipalities during election years (Drazen and Eslava
2010).
A related question regards how a change in government affects policy.
Examining a panel of 71 democracies over 1972-2003, Brender and Drazen
(2009) find that the replacement of a leader tends to have no significant effect
on expenditure composition in the short run, and small changes after four
years, mostly in developed countries. Within states in the U.S., a change
in who is governor may change policy: Bunce (1981) finds that who rules
makes a difference, but reanalysis of Bunce’s data by Brunk and Minehart
(1984) casts doubt on that. The issue studied below is not what happens im-
mediately after a change, but instead the effects of the frequency of change.
For example, a change in leadership may differ when changes are common
than when changes are rare. Our work complements Besley, Persson, and
Sturm (2010), who examine how political competition affects fiscal policy
and economic growth in U.S. states. They find that increased competition (as
measured by the difference between Democrat and Republican vote shares)
reduces taxes and increases capital spending. Our findings about the effect
of turnover on capital spending resemble theirs. We find, however, that
increased turnover increases taxes. And whereas they find that increased
competition increases economic growth, we find that increased turnover
reduces growth.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses
the historical pattern of turnover in the U.S. Section 3 explains the empirical
method and describes the data. Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5
concludes the paper.
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2 Historical patterns of turnover
Limited turnover and long legislative tenures in the United States are doc-
umented in much research. The pattern holds for legislatures both at the
federal and state levels, though turnover is slightly higher at the state level
than at the federal level. Legislative careers, however, were not always long.
Turnover in state legislatures during 1925-35 was high; on average, over half
of the legislators were first-time members, and only a handful of legislators
served more than three or four terms. Election defeats were only partially
responsible for this turnover, with inadequate compensation an important
factor in voluntary retirements (Hyneman 1938a and 1938b).
Turnover in U.S. states began to decline steadily after the 1930s. It
dropped from about 50% during 1931-40 to about 35% during 1971-76 (Shin
and Jackson 1979). It further declined to below 25% in the late 1970s and
1980s (Niemi and Winsky 1987). The overall decline, however, hides much
variation among states and across legislative chambers. Some southern
states such as Alabama, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Louisiana, and a
few non-southern states such as Maine and Maryland had consistently high
rates of turnover, whereas some urban, industrial states such as New York,
California, Illinois, and Massachusetts showed consistently lower rates of
turnover (Shin and Jackson 1979). Turnover is generally lower in upper
chambers than in lower chambers, in chambers with staggered terms (Shin
and Jackson 1979), and in single-member districts than in multi-member
districts (Niemi and Winsky 1987).
Among the many factors that contributed to the decline in turnover are
frequency of elections, reapportionment, the size of the chamber, the length
of a legislative session, and professionalization of legislatures (Rosenthal
1974a). Components of legislative compensation that contributed to a de-
cline in turnover and a corresponding increase in the length of tenure include
bureaucratic resources available to incumbents (Fiorina 1977), operating
budgets available to legislators (Berry, Berkman and Schneiderman 2000),
and salary (Carey, Neimi and Powell 2000).
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The decline in turnover and the resultant lengthening of legislative ca-
reers has raised concerns about too many career politicians and too little
“fresh blood,” about legislatures unresponsive to changing public interests,
and about legislatures unrepresentative of the population (Nye, Zelikow,
and King 1997, Patterson and Magleby 1992). Limits on the number of
terms legislators could serve were enacted by 21 states starting in the 1990s.3
(Most of these limits were enacted through voter initiatives to change state
constitutions.) Term limits were later repealed in six states—Idaho, Mas-
sachusetts, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. So currently, term
limits on legislators are found in fifteen states. Table 1 lists the states with
term limits on their legislatures, the year in which term limits were adopted,
and the year in which term limits first became binding (which is when the
first set of legislators are termed out).4
Term limits are the most significant institutional change in American
legislatures in recent times, with the varying stringency of term limit laws
making the effects of term limits on turnover vary across states.5 Some
states, such as Arizona, Florida, Louisiana, Maine, Ohio, and South Dakota,
have eight-year consecutive term limits, requiring members to sit out for at
least one term before running again. The following states have lifetime term
limits: Arkansas, California, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada and Oklahoma,
limiting legislators from serving a specified number of terms in each cham-
ber or over both chambers. The following states’ term limits are a time-out
of four years or longer: Colorado, Montana, and Wyoming. Starting in
1996, 65 members were term-limited in both California and Maine. Term
limits gained full steam in 1998 when many states termed out as many as
204 legislators. The turnover rate declined after the initial implementation
“hit,” though the level remains well above what it was before term limits
were adopted (Moncrief, Neimi and Powell 2004).
3 Many states approved similar limits on their congressional delegations. However, the
Supreme Court ruled such limits unconstitutional (U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton 1995).
4 Data are from www.ustl.org, first accessed in June 2009.
5 Kurtz, Niemi, and Cain 2007, p. 1.
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3 Method and Data
We estimate the following empirical model:
Yit = αi + γt + β × TURNOVERit + δ × Xit + µit, (1)
where Yit is a fiscal policy variable or else the long-run growth rate in state
i in year t; αi are the state fixed effects, which control for any state-specific,
time-invariant, factors; γt are the time fixed effects, which account for any
secular changes common across states; Xit is a vector of control variables;
and µit is a random error term.
More specifically, in the above regression models, the aggregate fiscal
policy measures used as the dependent variables are the percentage share of
total state government spending in state personal income, and the percent-
age share of state tax revenues in state personal income. Because elected
officials may have incentives to manipulate the composition of aggregate
spending and taxes,6 it is also useful to examine disaggregated measures
of fiscal policy as the dependent variables. The ones we use are various
components of total spending by the state government, and state tax rev-
enues, such as shares of current spending, capital spending, total sales taxes,
and total income taxes. The analysis of disaggregated components of fiscal
policy identifies how changes in a state’s fiscal policy may affect its long-run
growth. State and local finance data are used to compute our measures of
aggregated and disaggregated fiscal policy at the state level.7
The explanatory variable that most interests us is legislative turnover,
TURNOVERit, defined as the percentage of new legislators in state i in
election year t. This measure of turnover reflects the simple probability that
a legislator will not serve in the next term of a legislature. The turnover data
we use were collected by Moncrief, Niemi and Powell (2008), who compare
legislative membership at the beginning of the session immediately after
6 See Brender 2003, and Drazen and Eslava 2010.
7 This data is available from the tax policy center at http : //www.taxpolicycenter.org/,
first accessed in May 2010.
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the election in year t with membership immediately after the election, in
year t + 1. Since general elections for state legislatures are commonly held
in November, turnover observed in an election year is assumed to affect the
fiscal policy next year. Since turnover is only observed for election years,
we assume it to be constant between any two elections. The most recent
observed value of turnover is assumed to estimate the rate of turnover
for a current legislator, who then adjusts his fiscal behavior based on that
observation. Because all states but Nebraska have bicameral legislatures,
the aggregate measure of turnover consists of the simple average of turnover
rates in the two legislative chambers in each state.
The vector Xit consists of various economic, demographic, and political
control variables. The economic and demographic variables are the natural
logarithm of state personal income, the natural logarithm of state popula-
tion, the proportion of the population that is black, and the proportion of the
population aged 65 and over. We also control for various political factors.
The preferences of the majority party in a legislature, and hence party con-
trol of a legislature, may affect public policy (Garand 1988, Alt and Lowry
1994, Rogers and Rogers 2000, Besley and Case 2003). For example, Demo-
cratic control of the House is associated with higher government spending
(Alt and Lowry 1994, and Rogers and Rogers 2000). Democratic control of a
legislature is associated with significantly higher taxes and a redistribution
of spending in favor of family assistance (Besley and Case 2003). Accord-
ingly, we control for the strength of the majority party in each chamber: the
variable Democratic Legislature is 1 if the Democratic party controls both the
state house and senate; Republican Legislature is 1 if the Republican party
controls the legislature. We account for divided control of the state gov-
ernment, which is also found to affect policy (Alt and Lowry 1994, 2000,
and Besley and Case 2003); for example, divided government leads to larger
deficits (Alt and Lowry 1994). We create a dummy variable, Divided, which
is 1 if different parties control the House, Senate, and the governorship; the
variable is 0 if a sinlgle party controls the state government. We control for
term limits on governors with a dummy variable, which is 1 if the governor
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is term-limited and is 0 otherwise.
The data on state personal income and population come from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis. The data on proportion of black population, propor-
tion aged 65 and over, the majority party in the legislature, and the party of
the governor up to 2000 come from Leigh (2008).8
A methodological problem is that turnover may be endogenous. For
example, voters may more likely re-elect legislators in states with more
favorable spending policy. Inclusion of state and time fixed effects would
resolve the problem of endogeneity if omitted voters’ preferences remain
invariant over time, or change in a common fashion across states. But
voters’ preferences likely evolve over time. Also, common changes across
states are unlikely if state-specific shocks affect voters’ preferences over time.
To identify the effect of turnover on policy variables, we use an instrument
variable (IV) method.
The two instruments for the rate of turnover we use are term limit provi-
sions in various states (discussed above), and years in which states redistrict.
The variable regarding the redistricting instrument is an indicator variable
for the year in which a state adopted its final redistricting plan. The re-
districting can increase turnover, but need not affect policy in a particular
direction.
The term-limit instrument is a dummy variable which is 1 for the year
term limits became effective in that state and after, and 0 otherwise. A
justification for using this instrumental variable is that term limit laws vary
in their restrictiveness across states and take effect in different years.
For an instrument to be valid, it must fulfill two important conditions.
First, it should be highly correlated with legislative turnover. This indeed
holds for term limits. As discussed above, average turnover jumps dramati-
cally in term-limited states when the term limit laws take effect starting in the
mid-1990s (see Figure 1), implying a strong correlation between term limit
laws and turnover. As shown in Table 2, average turnover is much higher
8 The data are available at http : //people.anu.edu.au/andrew.leigh, which was accessed in
September, 2009. The data was extended to 2007 from The Book of the States.
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in term-limited states than in non-term-limited states, and the difference is
statistically significant. A similar correlation appears between redistricting
and turnover (see Moncrief, Niemi and Powell 2008). As seen in Figure 1,
average turnover over the period 1980-2007 increases following the decen-
nial redistricting. And Table 2 suggests that average turnover in redistricted
years is significantly higher than in non-redistricted years. We also find that
the first-stage F-statistics checking for the strength of the instruments are
much higher than the critical values suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997).
Second, a valid instrument must not be directly correlated with the policy
variables, though it could affect policy indirectly through turnover. This
exclusion restriction means that the instrument is included in the turnover
equation, but excluded from the equation which has a policy variable on
the left-hand side. We support this claim using two pieces of evidence.
First, the overidentification tests consistently do not reject the hypotheses
that the two instruments are excluded from the policy equation. Second, the
instrumental variables appear to be exogenous.
Regarding term limits, states do not adopt them selectively, with states
having the lowest turnover rates especially likely to adopt term limits. As
seen in Figure 1, the plots of average turnover in both term-limited and
non-term-limited states are similar before the mid-1990s, suggesting that
the term limit laws were not a response to lower turnover in term-limited
states. Ansolabehere and Snyder (2004) use term limit laws in the U.S.
states to instrument for strategic retirements by legislators, concluding that
term-limited states are comparable to non-term-limited states on many di-
mensions. Mooney (2009) also provides evidence that term-limited states are
comparable to non-term-limited states on various demographic, economic
and political variables.9
9 On one dimension, however, states with term limits differ from states without term
limits. All states with term limits, excepting Louisiana, allow voter initiatives to reform
their state constitution. Though it is plausible that states with voter initiatives may differ
systematically from states without such initiatives, the evidence does not support such
a conclusion. First, many states passed laws allowing voter initiatives almost a century
ago (Matsusaka 1995). Second, Smith and Fridkin (2008) argue that the factors that were
associated with term limits were transitory.
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Regarding redistricting, there is a similar concern with exogeneity of the
indicator variables for the year in which the final redistricted plan is im-
plemented. Nevertheless, others have used redistricting as an instrument.
Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart (2000) so use it when estimating the in-
cumbency advantage in the U.S. House elections. We also draw upon Besley
and Case (2003) who suggest using term limits and redistricting as major
institutional changes for dealing with endogeneity of political factors. And
to address the possibility that political parties create safe districts for them-
selves, we include indicator variables for partisan controls of legislature.
We end this section with Table 3, which compares means and standard
deviations for all the variables for the whole sample, term-limited and non-
term-limited states, and years of election after redistricting and otherwise.
4 Results
4.1 Legislative turnover and fiscal policy
We begin by examining the effect of legislative turnover on total spend-
ing and on the composition of spending. Results are in Table 4. Column
(1) shows OLS estimates: increased turnover increases total government
spending as a share of personal income. The effect is statistically signifi-
cant at the 1% level. Results using the two instrumental variables discussed
above are shown in column (2). Turnover continues to increase government
spending. The coefficient on turnover under the IV method is almost twice
the size of the OLS coefficient, and is statistically significant at the 5% level.
Substantively, an increase in turnover by about 25 percentage points, which
is the typical increase in term-limited states with lifetime term limits over
the sample period, results in about a 0.5 percentage points increase in the
share of spending, compared to the sample average share of about 13%.
The increase of government spending with turnover is consistent with the
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results of Tabellini and Alesina (1990) who study national governments.10
In theory, higher turnover can have opposing effects on capital spend-
ing. On one hand, high turnover can make a legislator care little about
future services, and so favor current spending over capital spending. On
the other hand, a legislator who expects to leave office soon may want to
commit future policy, and so favor capital-intensive, durable, projects (see
Glazer 1989). The effects of turnover on components of spending, (namely
current and capital spending) are shown in the remaining columns of Table
4. Turnover has a negative, albeit statistically insignificant, effect on current
spending as a percent of income, in both columns (3) and (4). The effect of
turnover on capital outlays as a percent of state income is shown in columns
(5)-(6). Though turnover has an insignificant effect on capital outlays using
OLS estimation in column (5), the effect is positive and statistically signifi-
cant at the 1% level in column (6) where we use IV estimation. So, we find
evidence consistent with the commitment hypothesis.
The instruments we use appear not to suffer from weakness: as discussed
above, average turnover rates differ significantly between states with and
without term limits, and between years in which final redistricted plans
were and were not implemented. A formal test for weak instruments, based
on the proportion of variation in the endogenous variable explained by
the instruments in the first stage, is given by Staiger and Stock (1997) and
Kleibergen and Paap (2006). Staiger and Stock (1997) and Baum, Schaffer
and Stillman (2006) suggest a cutoff value of 10 for the first-stage F-statistic,
below which the instruments may be weak. The value of the first-stage
F-statistic (Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic) in the specification used in Table
4 is 57.0, implying that our instruments strongly identify the variation in
turnover rates.
The validity of overidentifying restrictions can be examined using the
Hansen J test. The null hypothesis states that our instruments are properly
excluded from the model. Thus, a high value of the test statistic would lead
10 We also run all the results using the IV-GMM method and get similar results. These
results are available upon request.
12
to a rejection of overidentifying restrictions and imply that the instruments
are directly related to the error term in our model. The p-values of the test
statistics from this regression, given in Table 4, are higher than the conven-
tionally used levels of significance. We do not reject the null hypothesis that
the instruments are valid.
The effect of turnover on tax revenue and its components is shown in
Table 5. Increased turnover increases taxes as a share of income; in both
columns (1) and (2) the effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. In
terms of magnitude, the effect of a typical increase in turnover in states
with lifetime term limits (about 25 percentage points) on the share of taxes
ranges between 0.3-0.6 percentage points relative to a sample average of
7%. Turnover can also affect the composition of taxes. In column (3),
turnover significantly increases sales tax revenue as a share of personal
income. However, the coefficient on turnover loses statistical significance
in column (4), where we use the IV estimation. Increased turnover also
increases state income tax revenues as a share of personal income, as seen
in column (6), which uses IV estimation. The coefficient on turnover is
significant at the 5% level.
Table 6 further disaggregates tax revenues into general sales taxes, se-
lective sales taxes, individual income taxes, and corporate income taxes. In
column (3), turnover significantly increases general sales tax revenues as
a share of personal income. Among income taxes, turnover significantly
increases revenue from individual income taxes rather than from corporate
income taxes.
4.2 Alternative specifications and fiscal policy
Fiscal policy can differ under different political parties in power. The ma-
jority party may push for levels of government spending that accord with
its ideology. Also, the partisan effects on policy may differ depending on
whether a party controls only the legislature, or the governorship, or both.
Such partisan effects are studied in this subsection. Added to our basic
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specification are an indicator variable (Democratic Legislature) that is 1 if a
legislature is controlled by the Democratic party and 0 otherwise, and an
indicator variable (Republican Legislature) that is 1 if a legislature is controlled
by the Republican party and 0 otherwise. The excluded category is divided
control of a legislature. We also include an indicator variable (Divided) which
is 1 if control of the legislature and the governorship is divided and is 0 if a
single party controls both the legislature and the governorship, and another
indicator variable for whether the governor cannot stand for reelection.
As seen in columns (1) and (2) of Table 7, control of a legislature by either
Democrats or Republicans has an insignificant effect on spending as a share
of income. Total government spending as a share of income is significantly
higher when control of the legislature and governorship is divided than
when a single party controls both branches of state government. A state with
divided government spends about 0.15% more than does a state controlled
by a single party. The result is roughly consistent with the findings by
Poterba (1994) and by Alt and Lowry (1994) that U.S. states with divided
government delay fiscal adjustment, thereby generating deficits. A term-
limited governor spends significantly less than does a non-term-limited
governor. Total spending as a share of income is 0.14-0.18% lower for a state
in which the governor cannot stand for election than for a state in which he
can.
Inclusion of these additional covariates does not change our findings on
the effect of turnover: the effect remains positive and statistically significant
at the 1% level. Also, the effect of turnover on disaggregated spending is
similar to the findings above. Turnover has no significant effect on cur-
rent spending, but increased turnover increases capital outlays significantly.
The party control variables do not significantly affect the composition of
spending, except in columns (5) and (6), where Republican control of a leg-
islature significantly increases capital spending. A reelection constraint on
the governor significantly affects the composition of spending. Whereas
a term-limited governor has significantly lower current spending than a
non-term-limited governor in both columns (5) and (6), capital spending is
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significantly higher in column (6).
The effects of turnover on tax revenues, after including party control
variables, are shown in Table 8. As seen in columns (1) and (2), increased
turnover significantly increases tax revenue as a share of income. Turnover
significantly increases sales taxes in column (3), where we use OLS esti-
mation. As seen in column (6), turnover also significantly increases the
share of income taxes in state income. Thus, the signs and magnitudes of
the effects of turnover on fiscal policy variables are broadly consistent with
what we find above. In columns (1) and (2), the coefficient on Democratic
legislature is positive, implying higher taxes under a Democratic legislature
than under a divided legislature, though the effect is statistically insignif-
icant. A Republican legislature, in contrast, has significantly lower taxes
than a divided legislature; the share of taxes is about 0.3% less. As seen
in columns (5) and (6), Democratic control of a state legislature increases
income taxes; Republican control reduces income taxes. This result is con-
sistent with Rogers and Rogers (2000) and Besley and Case (2003), who find
significant partisan effects on fiscal policy. The variables indicating divided
control of the state government and whether a governor faces a binding
term limit do not significantly affect the revenue variables. The results are
similar in Table 9, which considers the disaggregated categories of tax rev-
enues, after including the additional covariates. Turnover increases general
sales taxes in column (3), and increases individual income taxes in column
(6). Under Democratic legislatures individual income taxes are significantly
higher. Under Republican legislatures selective sales taxes and corporate
income taxes are significantly lower, and general sales taxes are higher. A
state government with divided control has lower selective sales taxes than
does a government with the same party control. Also, in column (8), a term-
limited governor has significantly higher corporate income taxes compared
to a governor who is not term-limited.
The effect of turnover on fiscal variables may vary with partisan control
of a legislature. More specifically, a legislature with a Democratic majority
may behave differently from a legislature with a Republican majority when
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faced with high turnover. In Table 10, we find some evidence of varying ef-
fects of turnover with partisanship. In column (1), we interact our turnover
measure with indicator variables for a legislature with Democratic control
(Democratic Legislature) and a legislature with Republican control (Republi-
can Legislature). A Republican legislature has lower spending compared to a
divided legislature. However, increased turnover increases spending more
under Republican legislatures than under divided legislatures. In column
(2), we interact the indicator variable for term limits with indicator variables
Democratic Legislature and Republican Legislature and use these variables as
additional instruments. Using the IV method, we find that a Democratic leg-
islature has significantly lower spending compared to a divided legislature.
Turnover increases spending significantly more under Democratic legisla-
tures than under divided legislatures. The coefficient on the interaction
variable for turnover and Republican legislature is not significant. There
are interesting effects on the composition of spending. In columns (3)-(6),
under a Democratic legislature compared to a divided legislature, current
spending is significantly lower, whereas capital spending is the same. How-
ever, the effect of turnover on current spending is larger under a Democratic
legislature than under a divided legislature.
In columns (1) and (2) of Table (11), states with a Republican legislature
are seen to have lower taxes compared to states with a divided legislature.
Higher turnover increases taxes significantly more under Republican legis-
latures and Democratic legislatures than under divided legislatures. As seen
from column (6), this effect on total tax revenues arises from the tendency
of both Republican and Democratic legislatures to increase income taxes
when faced with increased turnover. Table 12 shows a difference in the type
of taxes Republicans and Democrats increase when faced with increased
turnover. Turnover increases individual income taxes for Democratic leg-
islatures, but Republican legislatures respond by increasing selective sales
and corporate income taxes.
We create three dummy variables to test for a non-linear effect of turnover:
turnover >= 45 indicates if turnover is greater than or equal to 45%; 30 <=
16
turnover< 45 indicates if turnover is greater than or equal to 30 but less than
45; and 15<= turnover< 30 indicates if turnover lies between 15 and 30. The
excluded category is turnover less than 15. In Table 14, the aggregate policy
variables, namely the share of expenditure in column (1), and tax revenue
as a share of income in column (4), show some non-linearities with respect
to turnover. Spending is only slightly lower for extreme values of turnover.
The share of taxes in income, however, shows no decline even at higher
levels of turnover. These results suggest that high turnover does not disci-
pline legislators. We find no significant non-linearities in the disaggregated
variables.
Policy may also be affected by political competition. One empirical find-
ing is that tighter gubernatorial races produce less governmental spending
(Rogers and Rogers 2000). Large electoral majorities in the U.S. states lead
to higher taxes, lower capital spending, lower likelihood of right-to-work
laws, and weaker economic growth (Besley and Case 2003, and Besley, Pers-
son, and Sturm 2010). These findings contrast with the effects of turnover,
an aspect of political competition, discussed above. To make sense of our
results in light of the existing literature, we include a direct measure of po-
litical competition in our regression model. This measure of competition,
based on Besley and Case (2003), is computed as follows:
POLCOMPit = −abs(DHOUSEit − 0.5) × abs(DSENATEit − 0.5) (2)
where DHOUSEit is the Democratic share of seats in a state’s lower house,
and DSENATEit is the Democratic share of seats in a state’s upper house.
The larger the value of POLCOMPit, the closer are the party strengths in a
legislature, and so the more intense the competition. The effects of political
competition, estimated by OLS regression, are reported in Table 14. The
effects of turnover stay as found above: political competition has a signif-
icantly positive effect on total spending. There are contrasting effects on
the composition of spending. Whereas political competition increases the
share of current spending, it reduces capital spending as a share of income.
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Political competition has no significant effect on taxes.
4.3 Economic growth
Increased turnover is associated with increased spending, increased taxes,
and increased spending on capital projects, which may be designed to con-
strain the policy choices of future office holders, whose policy preferences
the incumbents may not like. Such induced inefficiency in fiscal policy may
reduce long-run economic growth. Moreover, the theory of “stationary ban-
dits,” described above, suggests that legislators who may soon leave office
care less about future economic growth than do legislators who expect to
remain long in office.
To test for such effects, we measure long-run growth in each state with
a five-year moving average of the annual rate of growth of personal in-
come. As seen in column (1) of Table 16, growth declines significantly with
turnover. The coefficient on turnover remains negative and statistically sig-
nificant in column (2), using IV estimation. Substantively, an increase in
turnover by about 25 percentage points, which is the typical increase in
term-limited states with lifetime term limits over the sample period, results
in about an 0.3-0.6 percentage points decrease in the long-run growth rate,
compared to a sample average of about 2.8%.
Regression results including partisan controls and other political vari-
ables are shown in columns (3) and (4). Long-run growth is lower under
a Republican legislature by about 0.4 percentage points. Growth is slightly
lower if control of the state government is divided between parties. Uni-
fied control of state government leads to lower spending, which may pro-
mote long-run growth. However, contrary to the finding in Besley and Case
(1995), whether the governor is term-limited or not has no statistically signif-
icant effect on growth. Additionally, turnover reduces growth, with the ef-
fect statistically significant even after inclusion of these additional variables.
Columns (5) and (6) report on the effect of interaction between turnover and
partisan control variables on economic growth. Increased turnover increases
18
growth under a Democratic legislature significantly more than under a di-
vided legislature, though the effect is not significant in column (6) when we
use the IV method.
Lastly, we examine the effect of political competition on growth. Whereas
high turnover continues to reduce growth, political competition significantly
increases growth. The result is consistent with Besley, Persson, and Sturm
(2010), though we find that a mix of higher current spending and lower
capital spending achieves this result. One possible reason is that whereas
some investment may be driven by a desire to increase growth (as Besley,
Persson, and Sturm (2010) argue), legislators who fear losing power may fa-
vor capital-intensive projects not because the projects will increase growth,
but because legislators want to constrain future governments. Not all in-
vestment is efficient. We also find that high turnover alone is not sufficient
to increase competition. Increased turnover unaccompanied by increased
competition may skew legislators’ incentives toward short-term behavior.
5 Conclusions
This paper studied the effects of increased turnover on fiscal policies adopted
by states. Broadly speaking, the results suggest that increased turnover
increases the willingness of legislators to favor policies with long-term costs,
or at the least that increased turnover is associated with different fiscal
choices. Increased turnover increases capital spending, which is consistent
with the idea that legislators fearing loss of office aim to constrain future
policy. That hypothesis is also consistent with our finding that increased
turnover increases spending. A negative effect of turnover on long-run
economic growth supports the hypothesis that increased turnover induces
long-term distortions in the economy via suboptimal fiscal policy.
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Table 1: State legislative term limit laws in the United States
    
State Year Limited: terms 
(total years allowed) 
Year law 
takes effect 
Arizona 1992 House: 4 terms (8 years) 
Senate: 4 terms (8 years) 
House: 2000 
Senate: 2000 
Arkansas 1992 House: 3 terms (6 years) 
Senate: 2 terms (8 years) 
House: 1998 
Senate: 2000 
California 1990 Assembly: 3 terms (6 years) 
Senate: 2 terms (8 years) 
House: 1996 
Senate: 1998 
Colorado 1990 House: 4 terms (8 years) 
Senate: 2 terms (8 years) 
House: 1998 
Senate: 1998 
Florida 1992 House: 4 terms (8 years) 
Senate: 2 terms (8 years) 
House: 2000 
Senate: 2000 
Louisiana  1995 House: 3 terms (12 years) 
Senate: 3 terms (12 years) 
House: 2007 
Senate: 2007 
Maine 1993 House: 4 terms (8 years) 
Senate: 4 terms (8 years) 
House: 1996 
Senate: 1996 
Michigan 1992 House: 3 terms (6 years) 
Senate: 2 terms (8 years) 
House: 1998 
Senate: 2002 
Missouri 1992 House: 4 terms (8 years) 
Senate: 2 terms (8 years) 
House: 2002 
Senate: 2002 
Montana 1992 House: 4 terms (8 years) 
Senate: 2 terms (8 years) 
House: 2000 
Senate: 2000 
Nebraska 2000 Unicameral: 2 terms (8 years) Senate: 2008 
Nevada 1994 Assembly: 6 terms (12 years) 
Senate: 3 terms (12 years) 
House: 2006 
Senate: 2006 
Ohio 1992 House: 4 terms (8 years) 
Senate: 2 terms (8 years) 
House: 2000 
Senate: 2000 
Oklahoma 1990 12 year combined total for both houses State Legislature: 2004 
South Dakota 1992 House: 4 terms (8 years) 
Senate: 2 terms (8 years) 
House: 2000 
Senate: 2000 
Wyoming 1992 House: 6 terms (12 years) 
Senate: 3 terms (12 years) 
House: 2004 
Senate: 2004 
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s
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e
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e
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w
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d
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nd
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e
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e
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e
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%
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%
,a
nd
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c
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K
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rk
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c.
H
an
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s
J
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-v
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e
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lu
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e
H
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s
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h
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m
en
ts
ar
e
va
lid
ly
ex
cl
ud
ed
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e
m
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n
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